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Why	oil	matters	for	British	politics
Despite	not	being	talked	about	often	in	British	politics,	oil	has	a	very	important	role	in	the
economic	and	political	issues	that	confront	the	West.	Helen	Thompson	draws	on	her	new
book	to	explain	the	problems	that	the	rising	cost	of	oil	posed	in	the	years	leading	up	to	the
2008	crash,	and	the	difficulties	that	a	volatile	oil	market	currently	poses	to	economic	recovery.
Oil	is	a	fundamental	material	fact	of	collective	life,	but	it	is	little	talked	about	in	British	politics.
Yet	oil	played	a	big	part	in	the	economic	crash	of	2008	and	it	is	an	important	part	of	why	it	has
been	so	difficult	for	the	Bank	of	England	to	return	monetary	policy	to	any	semblance	of	normality	over	the	past
few	years.	The	international	politics	of	oil	production	and	consumption	are	shifting	geo-political	plates	in	ways	that
weaken	American	power,	divide	the	interests	of	European	countries,	and	ensure	a	contested	international
monetary	order.	If	British	politicians	don’t	want	to	talk	about	oil,	they	can’t	avoid	its	increasingly	sweeping
consequences.
Although	the	western	recessions	of	2007-09	are	usually	understood	as	the	result	of	the	global	financial	crisis,	this
narrative	distorts	what	were	two	inter-related	developments	over	the	preceding	decade	that	culminated	in	2008.
From	2002	to	the	middle	of	2008	oil	prices	rose	from	around	$27	a	barrel	to	$156.	By	far	the	sharpest	part	of	this
rise	occurred	over	the	last	twelve	months	of	the	period,	with	prices	near	doubling	from	$82	a	barrel	in	June	2007
to	$156	a	year	later.	It	was	this	acute	increase	in	oil	prices	that	sent	western	economies	into	recession	before	the
bankruptcy	of	Lehman	Brothers	in	September	2008	crashed	financial	markets	and	deepened	those	recessions.
Source:	Macro	Trends.	Prices	are	for	West	Texas	intermediate	and	inflation	adjusted	to	May	2017.
In	the	case	of	the	British	economy,	there	was	a	fall	in	national	output	in	the	second	quarter	of	2008	which	was
followed	by	a	further	fall	in	the	third	quarter,	only	part	of	which	could	have	been	the	consequence	of	the
developments	of	September	2008.	Strikingly,	household	expenditure	fell	in	the	first	quarter	of	2007	and	then
again	in	the	first	quarter	of	2008,	both	periods	when	oil	prices	rose	particularly	sharply.	It	then	rose	in	the	last
quarter	of	2008,	the	quarter	that	was	the	worst	of	the	British	recession	but	when	oil	prices	more	than	halved.
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Prior	to	2008	the	Bank	of	England	had	been	grappling	with	the	impact	of	rising	oil	prices	for	a	number	of	years.	In
September	2005	the	then	Governor	of	the	Bank,	Mervyn	King,	gave	a	speech	in	which	he	declared	that	oil	prices
had	ended	the	era	of	what	he	termed	NICE,	non-inflationary	consistently	expansionary	economic	growth.	As	King
explained,	rising	oil	prices	were	not	a	passing	contingency	but	the	consequence	of	fundamental	changes	in	the
international	economy.	The	rise	in	living	standards	in	non-western	economies,	in	particular	China,	was
dramatically	increasing	demand	for	oil.	Indeed,	China’s	oil	consumption	rose	from	3.9	million	barrels	per	day	in
1997	to	8	million	in	2008.	Meanwhile	oil	production	stagnated	in	the	middle	part	of	the	2000s,	as	ageing	oil	fields
passed	or	approached	their	peak,	not	least	in	Saudi	Arabia,	and	political	turmoil	and	western	sanctions	stymied
production	in	Iraq,	Iran,	Venezuela,	and	Nigeria.
In	this	new	energy	environment	British	inflation	and	output	would	be	volatile	and	real	disposable	incomes	would
suffer.	In	such	a	world,	King	argued,	the	Bank	of	England	simply	could	not	use	monetary	policy	to	deliver	quarter-
by-quarter	growth	or	achieve	economic	stability,	and	politicians	and	voters	needed	to	be	disabused	of	any	idea
that	it	could.	Indeed,	in	practice,	the	Bank	would	spend	the	second	half	of	2006	and	the	first	half	of	2007	using
monetary	policy	to	try	to	contain	the	risk	that	rising	oil	prices	would	lead	to	rising	wage	demands	and,	in	effect,
hoping	that	higher	interest	rates	would	reduce	growth	and	hence	push	oil	prices	down.
Although	King’s	speech	received	relatively	little	comment	at	the	time,	he	was	effectively	explaining	that	British
politics	was	becoming	subject	once	again	to	the	kind	of	energy	constraints	that	produced	such	political	tumult
between	the	early	1970s	and	the	mid-1980s,	and	the	kind	of	monetary	constraints	that	caused	such	difficulties	for
the	Conservative	governments	between	the	mid-1980s	and	mid-1990s.	In	this	economic	world	growth	would	not
be	a	given,	sterling	would	be	prone	to	severe	fluctuation,	and	distributional	conflicts	would	prevail.	The	immediate
aftermath	of	the	2008-09	British	recession	proved	him	correct.	The	return	in	2011	of	high	oil	prices	slowed
economic	recovery	and	intensified	the	political	difficulties	around	the	Coalition	government’s	attempt	to	cut	the
budget	deficit.	Indeed,	it	was	only	because	the	Bank	of	England,	unlike	the	European	Central	Bank,	decided	to
ignore	its	inflation	target	in	the	face	of	the	rise	in	oil	prices	over	2011	that	the	British	economy	was	saved	the
double-dipped	recession	that	afflicted	the	euro	zone.
What,	however,	King	could	not	have	foreseen	was	that	the	turn	after	2008	to	quantitative	easing	and	zero	interest
rates	would	ultimately	establish	conditions	that	in	making	shale	and	tar	sands	oil	production	possible	would	create
a	different	set	of	monetary	predicaments.	Oil	prices	began	to	slide	in	mid-2014	and	the	fall	escalated	when	in
November	of	that	year	the	Saudi	government	persuaded	its	fellow	OPEC	members	to	let	the	price	crash	in	the
hope	of	both	bankrupting	American	shale	producers	and	inducing	Russia	to	end	its	support	for	the	Assad	regime
in	Syria.	As	a	consequence,	the	Bank	of	England	had	to	abandon	its	plan,	formed	just	the	month	before	oil	prices
began	to	fall	on	the	premise	that	the	economy	was	now	returning	to	normal,	to	start	to	tighten	monetary	policy.
More	than	three	years	later	the	Bank	still	has	not	been	able	to	raise	interest	rates.
If	high	prices	caused	one	set	of	problems,	low	prices	have	caused	another.	There	is	now	no	equilibrium	price	that
would	simultaneously	keep	large-scale	shale	production	viable,	allow	sufficient	market	share	for	conventional	oil
producers,	and	allow	western	and	emerging-market	economies	to	grow	at	rates	that	will	meet	the	material	and
political	expectations	of	their	citizens.	Oil	has	produced	inescapable	predicaments.	It	is	rhetorically	easy	to	vow	to
end	the	sale	of	petroleum-	and	diesel-fuelled	cars	over	the	next	few	decades,	as	the	British	government	has
done.	But	the	determination	to	retreat	from	oil	whilst	the	world	continues	to	consume	around	an	additional	1
million	barrels	a	day	for	each	year	that	has	passed	since	2008	can	only	reinforce	all	the	economic	and	political
dysfunctionality	oil	creates.
_______
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	book,	Oil	and	the	western	economic	crisis.
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